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Room for Improvement
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David Arthur Skeel, JD

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),
signed into law on July 21, 2010, was a sprawling, imperfect, 2300-plus page
response to the worst financial crisis in the U.S. since the Great Depression.
It likely will be the only major financial reform legislation for the next generation, so it warrants regular retrospectives. Marking the law’s significant anniversaries
gives policymakers an opportunity to evaluate areas for
correction and amendment.

SURPRISES AND UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES IN THE FIRST FIVE YEARS
Five years after passage, many of Dodd-Frank’s rules
remain unwritten and some still await proposal, which is
not surprising given the number of issues and agencies
involved in writing and implementation. As of the fifth
anniversary in July, only 63% of rules had been finalized,
while about 20% had missed deadlines, the majority of
which concern derivatives and mortgage reforms (Figure
1).1 What is surprising, however, is that there is still
so much regulatory pressure on systemically important
financial institutions (SIFIs), particularly big banks.
Many insiders expected from the outset that banks
would be inducing regulatory rollbacks by now, but that
has not happened.2
There are many reasons why regulators’ policing
efforts remain aggressive and why the U.S. is not moving

SUMMARY
• This brief offers a 5-year retrospective on Dodd-Frank, pointing
out aspects of the legislation that would benefit from correction
or amendment.
• Dodd-Frank has yielded several key surprises—in particular,
the extent to which the Federal Reserve has become the primary
regulator of the financial industry. This reflects a problem,
namely that the regulatory framework established by DoddFrank violates the requirements of the rule of law. It relies too
heavily on regulatory discretion, is insulated from effective
oversight, and eschews transparency.
• In light of Dodd-Frank’s departures from rule of law, the legislation could be improved in several ways: by clarifying the rules
by which regulators designate entities as strategically important
financial institutions (SIFIs) and require their creation of living
wills; providing better incentives for banks to downsize more
efficiently; curbing incentives for banks to shift key operations
to the shadow banking system; instituting bankruptcy reforms
that would discourage government bailouts; and easing regulatory burdens on smaller banks that are disproportionately
burdened by the SIFI designation process.
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in a less regulatory direction after five
years, but three causes stand out. The
first is the London Whale incident
of 2012, which single-handedly
accounted for the severity of the
Volcker Rule. The London Whale, a
nickname given to JPMorgan trader
Bruno Iksil, whose job entailed trading for his firm’s own account (i.e.,
proprietary trading), developed an
excessively large position in the credit
default swap market that had to be
written down as a loss. When the dust
settled, the activities of this one trader
caused a $6.2 billion loss for his firm.3
This type of high-capacity, high-risk
trading within commercial banking
and lending institutions like JPMorgan is what the Volcker Rule seeks
to eliminate by limiting proprietary
trading and separating it from a bank’s
normal, market-making and clientbased activities. How the rule will
work in practice is not so clear cut.4
An unintended consequence of
Dodd-Frank is that the Volcker Rule
already has pushed several critical
banking functions into the shadow
banking system and it likely will continue to do so.5 Big banks appear to
be retrenching on some of the operations the law permits them to engage
in, such as market-making and trading
for clients. This is especially true in

the case of bonds and is leading to
liquidity issues in the bond market
because banks have cut back on permissible and borderline bond trading
as they have shed their proprietary
trading businesses. As more and more
activity moves into the shadow banking system, proprietary trading could
become less regulated (and more
elaborately disguised), defeating the
initial intentions of the Volcker Rule.
The second spur for the surprisingly aggressive Dodd-Frank rulemaking is the LIBOR scandal, a
story that broke on the heels of the
London Whale. Several British and
international news agencies exposed
widespread, fraudulent manipulation
of LIBOR rates in trades between big
banks, which colluded for over two
decades to boost appearances of creditworthiness and to increase profits
from this rate rigging. U.S. derivatives—a several hundred trillion dollar
market—and other financial products
benchmark their interest rates on
LIBOR, so this manipulation affected
markets and consumers around the
world, but especially in the U.S. The
British government gained oversight
of LIBOR after much investigation,
and new regulations soon passed the
U.K. Parliament. In the U.S., this incident and the London Whale scandal

increased scrutiny into banks with
global trading operations at a time
when U.S. agencies were in the midst
of Dodd-Frank rulemaking.
The third explanation for the
current regulatory climate is Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA). The
election of Warren to the Senate was
an unintended consequence of critics’
successful derailment of her nomination to head the new Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB),
which was inspired by Warren’s own
research as a Harvard professor. If
Warren had been approved as the first
CFPB head, she wouldn’t have run for
the Senate. Since joining Congress in
2013, Warren has deftly utilized her
new platform and committee positions, particularly her role in the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, to champion tough
financial regulation and consumer
protection among her colleagues and
in the media. The CFPB, which she
also helped to implement as an advisor to the President, has been a valuable and necessary innovation, but the
Bureau does have a designated source
of funding and a centralized structure,
which makes overturning any of their
decisions difficult. The CFPB will
need to avoid mission creep in the
long-run to avoid becoming another

NOTES
http://graphics.wsj.com/dodd-frank-anniversary/.
One major exception is the so-called “swaps pushout” rule.
This would have required banks to move their derivatives
trading out of their commercial bank subsidiaries, but was
repealed as part of budget legislation.
3 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-21/
jpmorgan-directors-don-t-have-to-face-london-whale-lossclaims.
4 The Volcker Rule did not take effect until July 2015.
5 The shadow banking system refers to the entirety of non1
2

bank financial intermediaries that perform many of the
same functions commercial banks do, but without oversight.
Shadow banks raise funds to buy assets, but they have no
deposit insurance and no recourse to the Federal Reserve
in a crisis. Examples include hedge funds, money market
mutual funds, structured investment vehicles, and many
other types of entities. (For more, see: http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/06/basics.htm).
6 This concern has merit, given recent loan regulations issued
by the CFPB affecting auto dealers and for-profit colleges,
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among other types of non-financial entities.
For more information, see Susan Wachter, “Next Steps in
the Housing Finance Reform Saga,” Penn Wharton Public
Policy Initiative Issue Brief, March 2015: http://publicpolicy.
wharton.upenn.edu/issue-brief/v3n2.php.
8 For more information on bank stress-tests, see Itay Goldstein, “Disclosure of Bank Stress-Test Results,” Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative Issue Brief, June 2013: http://
publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/issue-brief/v1n6.php.
9 The Fed recently released its proposed rule implementing
7
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FIGURE 1: FIVE YEARS LATER: DODD-FRANK RULEMAKING PROGRESS (JULY 2015)
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Source: DavisPolk, “Dodd-Frank Progress Report,” July 16, 2015.

negative, unintended consequence of
Dodd-Frank.6
Another striking development
(or lack thereof ) in the last five years
is lawmakers’ failure to reform Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac since the
federal government placed them in
conservatorship in 2008. The U.S.
Treasury has been collecting all profits
from these entities since Fannie and
Freddie began making them again
in 2012, so in that sense the lack of
reform and restructuring is not shocking. But because these institutions
were key factors in the financial crisis,
their exclusion from new legislation
was odd five years ago and the continual absence of Fannie and Freddie
reform is no less curious. Their limbo
status in conservatorship effectively

halts any significant housing finance
reform measures going forward.7
The final major surprise over the
last five years is the extent to which
the Federal Reserve has become the
primary regulator of the financial
industry via both Dodd-Frank and
non-Dodd-Frank stress-tests, as well
as living wills (see below).8 DoddFrank did limit the emergency power
of the Fed by prohibiting it from
making emergency loans to individual
institutions in an attempt to discourage future bailouts akin to those made
in 2008.9 But the Fed’s enforcement
of capital and liquidity standards now
appears to be the most important regulatory development of Dodd-Frank,
and this is one of several “rule of law”
concerns to which we now turn.

EVALUATING DODD-FRANK
UNDER THE RULE OF LAW
The rule of law, according to the
Resolution of the Council of the
International Bar Association (2005),
“establishes a transparent process
accessible and equal to all. It ensures
adherences to principles that both
liberate and protect.” In the context
of financial regulation, the rule of
law requires that any intervention
by regulators be governed by legal
rules and not merely by discretionary choice. In matters of discretion,
policy must be decided by those who
write the rules and not by those who
enforce them. The rule of law, therefore, requires legal provisions to be
specific. Furthermore, in the instance

NOTES
this restriction.
David Skeel, The New Financial Deal: Understanding the
Dodd-Frank Act and Its (Unintended) Consequences (Hoboken, NJ, 2011).
11 In its short life, the FSOC already has considered designating as SIFIs such entities as mutual funds and hedge funds,
whose catastrophic impact upon theoretical failure is clearly
debatable.
12 http://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-fdic-rebuke-bankruptcy-plans-of-11-of-nations-biggest-banks10
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1407270607?alg=y.
Single point of entry (SPOE), to oversimplify, entails taking
over a holding company, establishing a bridge institution,
and transferring all secured debt and short-term liabilities
of the holding company to the bridge institution, as well
as all licenses and other assets. Company stock and bond
debt would remain with the holding company. The old stock
would likely be canceled, and the bondholders would receive
stock in the new bridge institution in place of their debt. The
new bridge institution would thus be a recapitalized version

3

of the failed holding company. In recent months, the banks
have suggested they would shed assets in connection with
the recapitalization, which looks somewhat more like a
liquidation than previous versions of the SPOE strategy.
14 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-20/
volcker-rule-will-cost-banks-up-to-4-3-billion-occ-says.
15 The one day stay on derivatives does not apply to derivatives
traded outside the U.S., and the largest banks have many
subsidiaries overseas that engage in this activity. This appears to be part of the reason that the Fed failed the 11 liv-
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of a violation or a regulatory intervention, the affected person or institution
must have recourse to their right of
due process. The regulatory framework established by Dodd-Frank violates all of these rule of law requirements. It relies heavily on regulatory
discretion, is insulated from effective
oversight, and eschews transparency.
Operating under the assumption
that giant financial institutions are
inevitable and that the federal government should simply make sure it
has the tools to control them, DoddFrank foments a partnership between
the government and the largest banks
which began during the financial
crisis when regulators rescued Bear
Stearns—one of the nation’s largest
investment banks—rather than allowing Bear Stearns to file for bankruptcy
in early 2008. This mistake shaped the
subsequent actions of regulators, as
well as the way that another investment bank, Lehman Brothers, chose
to operate (and not seek to sell itself )
before its own failure later that year.
The partnership between the government and the biggest banks resembles
the European style of regulation
known as corporatism, which is far
removed from the rule of law virtues
traditionally associated with U.S.
financial regulation.10

There are four important components of Dodd-Frank that violate
the rule of law. The first is a feature
of Title I, which gives regulators
the authority to designate financial
institutions as systemically important.
Bank holding companies that have
more than $50 billion in assets are
automatically deemed to be SIFIs
and, as of late 2015, regulators from
the new Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) have designated as systemically important four
other institutions: AIG, Prudential,
GE Capital, and Metropolitan Life
(although MetLife is contesting its
SIFI status in court). Not only is this
designation process overinclusive for
bank holding companies, for already
many regional banks that surpass the
$50 billion asset threshold are struggling with compliance requirements
designed to apply equally to global
behemoths, but it is highly arbitrary
for other SIFIs, as well, since the
FSOC faces few real constraints on
which institutions to designate.11
Title I reveals the problem with
corporatism most starkly. SIFIs are
subject to stricter regulations, including more stringent capital standards,
but the largest SIFIs also have special
relationships with their regulators
who, through the law, protect them

NOTES
ing wills in 2014. The Fed felt that single point of entry would
not work without a stay on derivatives globally. The living
will reprimands resulted in a new International Swaps and
Derivatives Association (ISDA) protocol that mandates just
that – a global one day stay. Every major bank has agreed to
abide by the terms of the ISDA protcol.
16 Dodd-Frank gives the Fed authority to rescue a failing
clearinghouse.
17 A similar policy was recommended in a bill sponsored by
Senators Sherod Brown (D-OH) and David Vitter (R-LA) in

2013. For more on that bill, see: http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2013/05/01/in-brown-vitter-bill-a-banking-overhaulwith-possible-teeth/?_r=0.
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from competition.
The second rule of law concern is
another feature of Title I that requires
institutions designated as SIFIs to
prepare a rapid resolution plan each
year, often referred to as a living will.
Living wills are plans for how an
institution would pursue an orderly
bankruptcy in such a way as to minimize systemic damage. These plans
are valuable and a welcome inclusion
in Dodd-Frank because they can be
used to simplify the structures of
large financial institutions for regulators, but in practice their use has
been far from transparent. The Fed
and the FDIC have complete discretion to accept or reject a living will
(with punishments attached), and in
2014 they chose to reject the living
wills of 11 banks with assets greater
than $250 billion.12 If this were an
instance of clear cut non-compliance,
the regulations would be working
effectively. But the priorities and
considerations of regulators in evaluating these living wills are opaque
and not connected to any formal,
public legal framework. Such cloudy
regulatory intervention gives banks a
strong incentive to be non-transparent themselves about their operations,
contrary to the intended spirit of
Dodd-Frank.
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The third concern involves the
Orderly Liquidation Authority under
Title II, which was created to give
regulators, in this case the Treasury,
the Fed, and the FDIC, the authority
to take over a financial institution facing an impending failure which could
result in systemic harm. Regulators
can trigger a takeover resolution by
submitting a petition in federal court
with extremely limited judicial review
(24 hours). The speed and secrecy (the
hearing itself is unannounced) of the
decision essentially prevents companies from challenging a takeover. This
process is likely unconstitutional, as
it appears to violate the due process
requirements of the U.S. Constitution, although it would be difficult in
practice for a SIFI to challenge the
violation before its takeover occurred.
For the moment, regulators thus
have largely unchecked discretion
over whether and when to take over
a financial institution on the verge
of default, as well as how to resolve
the situation once the SIFI goes
into receivership. As in the case of
an ordinary bank resolution, Title II
grants the FDIC blanket authority
to pay claims to creditors in full if it
wishes, and it also allows for established priority payment rules to be
abandoned for the sake of systemic
stability. Interestingly, despite the fact
that Title II requires that its resolution provisions be used to liquidate
troubled SIFIs and not to reorganize
them, the FDIC has been exploring a strategy for resolving SIFI
issues (i.e., reorganizing) over the last
few years. Senator Barbara Boxer’s
(D-CA) “thou shalt liquidate” mandate may be the clearest directive of
the entire Dodd-Frank Act, but the

FDIC’s stated intention to utilize
the so-called “single point of entry”
strategy in the case of a future failure
to recapitalize SIFIs seems to be in
direct conflict with the language of
Title II.13 How this will play out in
practice bears watching.
The final rule of law issue involves
the Volcker Rule. As noted above, this
rule attempts to achieve a 21st century
version of the Glass-Steagall Act’s
separation of commercial and investment banking by prohibiting bank
holding companies from engaging in
proprietary trading and by limiting to
3% of total assets their investments
in hedge funds and equity funds. This
is a quixotic quest because it is nearly
impossible to distinguish proprietary
trading from normal market-making
and client-based trading. Over time,
even the line between investment
and commercial banking within bank
holding companies likely will blur,
and the five different regulators
charged with enforcing the Volcker
Rule will not be able to sufficiently
monitor trading in the world’s largest
financial institutions.
Beyond the clear and already present failures and inefficiencies of the
Volcker Rule, the costs of compliance
and implementation have skyrocketed to $4.3 billion and $413 million,
respectively. The burden falls disproportionately on smaller community
and regional banks that don’t have
legal resources comparable to the
biggest banks.14 This causes an economic drag when smaller banks are
unable to make loans to small and
mid-sized businesses at the level they
might in the absence of these vast
compliance challenges.
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OBSERVATIONS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
IMPROVING DODD-FRANK
One area of reform that Dodd-Frank
largely got right concerns derivatives.
The derivatives regulations in the
law have been encouraging thus far,
especially the creation of clearinghouses for over-the-counter trading,
the increased disclosure requirements,
and the establishment of a one day
stay on derivatives.15 The majority of
interest rate swaps and credit default
swaps now are being cleared over the
exchanges, although foreign exchange
and commodities derivatives did
escape the new regulations. By requiring clearing, Dodd-Frank substitutes
one type of too big to fail institution
for another (yet another unintended
consequence), but this is likely an
improvement from the pre-crisis environment because regulators should be
able to better manage a failing clearinghouse than they would a large bank
with its complicated organizational
structure.16
Given Dodd-Frank’s unintended
consequences and departures from
the rule of law, how might the legislation be improved? Here are several
recommendations.
Recommendation 1: Restore the
rule of law by reducing regulator discretion. One obvious corrective might
be to require greater transparency and
clearer rules for Title I’s designation
and living will processes.
Recommendation 2: Relatedly,
policymakers should give banks an
incentive to downsize efficiently,
as opposed to creating a blanket
prohibition on proprietary trading.
This would help to ensure that these
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institutions do not also retreat from
market-making and client services,
which hurts system-wide liquidity,
and that less activity gets pushed
into the shadow banking system,
which already is occurring because
of the Volcker Rule. One solution
might be onerous capital requirements on banks above a certain
asset level (e.g., $500 billion), which
would let banks decide for themselves how to shed businesses.17
Recommendation 3: Policymakers should be mindful of activity
outside the traditional financial
system and curb the incentives to
shift key operations to the shadow
banking system. This could include
shadow banking regulations or new
SIFI regulations focused on risk
level rather than capital level, type
of activity, or entity. Any regulations
based on risk and not on entity type
would require collapsing regulators
(e.g., SEC and CFTC), and while
there is little to no appetite for
that in Washington, reforms that
point in this direction are worth
serious consideration.
Recommendation 4: To further
reduce regulators’ incentive to bail
out large troubled financial institutions, lawmakers should adopt a

handful of bankruptcy reforms that
would better facilitate a financial
institution bankruptcy. The most
important change involves imposing
a stay, or a standstill, on derivatives
counterparties when a SIFI declares
bankruptcy. The derivatives industry
managed to get an exemption from
the normal bankruptcy rules, which
mandate that collections be stopped
immediately, contracts cannot be
terminated, and collateral cannot be
sold. In the last five years, there has
been movement around this issue to
help SIFIs on the verge of default by
enacting bankruptcy reform similar
to the single point of entry strategy.
Legislation on this issue, which
would include derivatives, is pending
in Congress.
Recommendation 5: Off-ramps
for small banks that are disproportionately burdened by the SIFI
designation process’s size limits
and CFPB regulations would be
beneficial. A bill sponsored by
Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL), for
instance, would authorize regulators
to subject banks between $50 billion
and $500 billion in assets to Title I
oversight, but would make inclusion
automatic only at the $500 billion
level. The Shelby bill would further

6

ease regulatory burdens on banks
and credit unions with less than $10
billion in assets, as these institutions
would no longer need to abide by
the Volcker Rule.

CONCLUSION
The Dodd-Frank Act sought to limit
risk in the financial system before a
SIFI failure or crisis (and thus limit
the amount of activity flowing into
the shadow banking system) by regulating key instruments, like derivatives, and institutions, like banks and
insurance companies. The law also
sought to limit damage in the event
of any systemically important financial institution’s failure. Although
the objectives and some of the
new regulations are admirable, the
legislation attempts to accomplish
its dual mandate through corporatist
regulations that stray from traditional U.S. rule of law virtues, and
it has spawned a series of negative,
unintended consequences. But the
law can be corrected and improved.
Dodd-Frank still has the potential
to help safeguard the financial system if some of its obvious kinks are
worked out.
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